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Lift ing the Veil of Relativism
RENATA KATALIN SMITH –  JOSÉ C OLEN
Th is paper argues that relativism prevents discourse, positive interaction 
and the growth of understanding since relativism eliminates the possibility 
of doubt and, subsequently, reason. Conversely, pluralism supports the con-
cept of a universal moral claim in that we can only understand a fragment 
of the universe, but through dialogue, can advance towards greater under-
standing. Th is approach allows human beings in a multicultural society to 
move away from bigotry toward understanding and create a “we” rather 
than an “us” and “them” mentality. A continued claim of the validity of rel-
ativism would only hinder this process. In a more positive vein, we will also 
try to review some logical and pragmatic arguments that suggest how rela-
tivism can be overcome and universal moral rules can be defended without 
hindering pluralism.
Introduction: relativism defi ned 
In attempting to refute relativism, it has frequently been argued that relativism refutes 
itself. In other words, if relativism in a relative world can only be one of the many 
possible truths, it in eff ect renders itself relative. We argue here that this critique of 
relativism, although true, is by far neither the only nor necessarily the strongest refu-
tation that should be used. Th ere are several other challenges that relativism faces and 
a careful critique and consideration is therefore necessary to discuss these challenges.
First, we must consider what relativism is. Relativism, lato sensu, is not a singular 
philosophical doctrine. Instead, it encompasses a family of doctrines, all considering 
“that a central aspect of experience, thought, evaluation, or even reality is somehow 
relative to something else” (Swoyer 2014). Relativist doctrines depend on the individ-
ual’s perspective, because no object corresponds to judgments, preferences, emotions 
or worldviews of a man or a group, so it makes no sense to speak of truth or falsehood 
(Cf. Berlin 1990/2013. 80). 
A comprehensive set of categorical defi nitions can be found by breaking relativ-
ism down into two main categories, namely, that of a ‘moral doctrine’ and ‘metaethi-
cal doctrines’ (Tännsjö 2007. 124). Within the metaethical kinds of relativism, there 
are positive and negative forms of relativism. Th e negative forms are “nihilistic” since 
“there is no moral truth…there exist no moral facts…there are no moral proposi-
tions whatever” (Tännsjö 2007. 124). Th e positive forms include semantic, epistemic 
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and ontological moral relativism, all of which posit that there are many moral truths 
(Tännsjö 2007. 125). 
Relativist motifs oft en rely on the foundation of a “truistic” (Swoyer 2014) premise. 
Th is foundation claims that a thing may be true within a certain context – or frame-
work – and that the same thing may be false within another historical context, that it 
can be true or false for some groups and in some historical periods, but not for oth-
ers. Truth is relative to a framework of concepts, norms or practices: “truth is relative 
because meaning is contextual and being is relational” (Taylor 1978. 41). Diff erent 
individuals may still come to diff ering conclusions since they “inhabit diff erent moral 
(socially constructed) universes” (Tännsjö 2007. 125). Even the narrowing of relativ-
ism as an umbrella term to focus on modern relativism, it is still a broad term that 
encompasses many diff erent strands of thought and diff erent fi elds, including: cultur-
al relativism, political relativism, scientifi c relativism and moral relativism (Swoyer 
2014). Whether looking at positive or negative relativism, there is no universal ob-
jective truth. All forms of relativism rely on social construct and historical context as 
determinants of an individual’s perspective. 
Relativism is important in discussions across various disciplines today, because 
morals have become a part of a theory of good instead of belonging to the sphere of 
practical action of the agent. In the context of relativism, one’s own morals can only 
be accurately seen from his/her own fi rst-person perspective, like a policy from the 
viewpoint of the agent who created it and not an observation of the same policy from 
a politician in another hemisphere, or an observer from Mars. An individual decides 
what is right or wrong from the context of his/her own framework, but because there 
are many truths, he/she cannot accurately understand another’s moral framework. 
However, placing morals within a greater theory of good counters this agent-centered 
viewpoint. Debates concerning relativism have thus arisen in political science, ethics, 
theology, sociology and even philosophy. Across these disciplines several prominent 
challenges to relativism have become apparent.
Th ese challenges can be divided into three categories: logical, practical and un-
expected consequences. Firstly, analytic challenges dealing with self-refutation and 
empirical problems create dilemmas for the philosophical possibility of relativism. 
Secondly, relativism is impractical and virtually impossible in practice concerning 
policy-making in a multi-cultural society – for example, immigration can add to this 
impossibility. Th irdly, relativism can lead to unexpected consequences that pose a so-
cietal danger by creating a clash of irreconcilable diff erences between or among cul-
tures that may in fact hamper tolerance and deter peace.
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Logical challenges
A common critique of relativism, only briefl y touched on here, is that relativism sim-
ply refutes itself. If everything relies on social constructs and historical context then 
moral relativism as a theory is a product of Western society in a post-war, twentieth 
century historical framework. It follows that relativism might be true for post-war 
twentieth century society but cannot escape losing relevance in other contexts and 
eras. Relativism thus faces the problem of being relative. Th is historical context is in-
tegral to relativism and in this particular incarnation it is called historicism. German 
historicism maintains three conclusions that implicitly lead to complete relativism: 1) 
it is impossible to defi ne universal norms of conduct, 2) all ethics are expressions of 
social structures and 3) one cannot rationally defi ne duty, “what to do or want” (Aron 
1938/2006, 372). However, historicism is not an isolated declaration; it is a trans-his-
torical vision that exempts itself from the verdict on the precariousness of human 
thought. Instead it transcends the cycle (Strauss 1953. 25). 
A radical, existential historicism, like that of Heidegger, responded to Nietzsche’s 
denial of the trans-historical nature of the historicist thesis, rejecting any possibility of 
objective analysis, because all life is commitment. 
Philosophy […] presupposes that the whole is knowable, that is, intelligi-
ble. Th is presupposition leads to the consequence that the whole as it is in 
itself is identifi ed with the whole in so far as it is intelligible; […] it leads 
to the identifi cation of “being” with “intelligible” or “object”; […] Th e 
presupposition mentioned is said to have its root in the dogmatic identi-
fi cation of “to be” in the highest sense with “to be always,” […] Th e dog-
matic character of the basic premise of philosophy is said to have been 
revealed by the discovery of history or of the “historicity” of human life. 
[…] “to be” in the highest sense cannot mean – or, at any rate, it does not 
necessarily mean – “to be always” (Strauss 1953. 30-31).
It played a key role that radical historicism could deny the trans-historical char-
acter of its doctrine. Nietzsche’s attack on nineteenth century historicism shows that 
historicism devalues all global visions of the world. It creates impossibility because 
it would destroy the “protecting atmosphere within which life or culture or action is 
alone possible. […] Th e theoretical analysis of life is noncommittal and fatal to com-
mitment, but life means commitment” (Strauss 1953. 26). Followers of historicism de-
fi ne thinking as essentially subservient to life. Such arguments of self-refutation have 
sprung up again and again in opposing historicism and the various forms of twentieth 
century relativism.
Self-refutation is not the only problem inherent to relativism. A problem arises from 
the main root of cultural relativism itself: the conception stating that morality is relative 
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because it is contextual or a social construct. Th e radical relativist viewpoint describes 
the rigidity of frameworks and the paradigms that prevent meaningful communica-
tion with ‘Others’ considerably diff erent from ourselves: “we are prisoners caught in 
the framework of our theories; our expectations; our past experiences; our language” 
(Popper 1970. 56). Th e frameworks in which we are imprisoned are the individual’s 
environment, the historical context, cultural infl uences and innumerable other factors. 
Th is contextual element creates the framework for an individual to draw conclusions 
and make moral judgments as to what is right and what is wrong. An inherent problem 
exists in this framework, namely, “notions of incommensurability appear to rest on the 
assumption that frameworks are totally closed and unchangeable” (Young 1997. 499). 
Th is closed framework concept is paradoxical. By stating that an individual’s 
framework is subject to factors such as environment, language, religion and historical 
experience, cultural relativism admits that human beings are shaped and infl uenced 
by their surroundings and time period rather than by a genetically inherited frame-
work. Th is implies that a radical relativist would agree with the argument that there 
are in fact “no innate principles or ideas” (Locke 1690/2013. 27-85). By conceding to 
a tabula rasa notion of a newborn human being and that the individual subsequently 
builds a moral framework according to the surrounding environment and era, the rel-
ativist faces a fundamental contradiction. If individuals can be shaped, at what point 
does the social construction stop; at what point do individuals stop learning from each 
other? In countering ethnocentrism, moral and cultural relativism do so through a 
“postmodern retreat from any epistemic judgments. In such a view, it is not possible to 
speak of cultures ‘learning’ from each other” (Young 1997. 501). But this is inherently 
impossible if a human being’s moral framework is developed through exposure to oth-
er human beings in a specifi c society. 
Discoveries in anthropology and other social sciences – including history – sup-
port the idea that no single moral value was ever shared across tribes and civilizations. 
Strauss summarizes this view by expressing that no examples exist where principles of 
justice have not been denied in a certain society or culture1 (Strauss 1953. 9). Howev-
er, can one deduce the diversity of law from de facto diversity? (Aron 1938/2006. 370). 
Th e historicist argument impresses us because it presents itself as extremely plausible. 
Th e plausibility of historicism comes from the opposition of past dogmas: “No compo-
nent man of our age would regard as simply true the complete teaching of any thinker 
of the past. (…) It is reasonable to assume that what has invariably happened up to 
now will happen again and again in the future” (Strauss 1953. 20-21).
However, the “experience of history” at the base of historical relativism is nothing 
but a “bird’s-eye view of the history of thought” (Strauss 1953. 22) because historical 
knowledge is always fragmentary. Instead, rather than legitimizing historicism, history 
1 However, he objects that no one has shown this refusal to always be justifi ed or even reasonable.
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itself proves that fundamental themes and problems persist within all philosophical 
thought. Th is “unchanging framework” (Strauss 1953. 23) is incompatible both with 
diff erences in approach and with the diversity of solutions in diff erent epochs. Only 
if the responses to these problems were “essentially” (Strauss 1953. 23) contradictory 
and none of them were greater or more important than another might one infer that 
we cannot solve any problem in a universally valid manner.
Relativism claims that although natural right must be universally recognized by 
human reason, the social sciences show that an infi nite variety of conceptions of ‘right’ 
exists. Th erefore, there are no immutable principles of justice. An extreme consequence 
would be to assert that moral decisions are beyond the competence of reason and rea-
son allows for an equal defense of truth and good or misdeeds and atrocious conduct 
(Strauss 1953. 42). Reason loses its force. If we are capable of passing judgments only 
inside our own social framework, and all other actions outside of our social construct 
are relative to their own frameworks, we are unable to truly observe and evaluate these 
actions or even compare them to others. Th e basis of relativism is, in fact, more pro-
found, namely, a disbelief in the very possibility of knowledge of what is naturally true 
or right. Reason presupposes a chance for legitimacy and a possibility for falsehood 
and doubt. Reason implies that there is some element of doubt that allows us as human 
beings to observe, question and evaluate before drawing conclusions. 
Finally, a simple empirical observation reveals that nobody actually lives his life as 
if all of his life-choices were of equal moral value or truth-value. Reason and self-eval-
uation of our own moral frameworks infl uence our thoughts as to which moral goods 
or values we personally deem superior or inferior and we consciously or unconsciously 
rank their importance. Th is would suggest that even if relativism were logically valid, it 
was existentially impossible.
All these considerations may appear philosophical and abstract, but now we turn 
to some practical examples and to the consideration of real unexpected consequences 
that challenge relativism. 
Practical challenges 
It is true that relativists are right to challenge universalist claims and note that “there is 
value in recognizing that universalism is sometimes a cover for cultural imperialism, 
that agency is something we struggle for [and] that identity is not as simple as the sto-
ries we prefer to tell about our subjective formation” (Young 1997. 498). However, ap-
plying these notions to practical policy-making is unrealistic. Domestic policy-mak-
ing in diverse societies would be diffi  cult, if not impossible, if it relied on the validity of 
relativism. For example, immigration poses a problem for relativism, because diff erent 
cultures may clash.
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Although we mentioned above that no individual leads his/her life as a true relativ-
ist, relativism injects itself into Western discourse particularly through multicultural-
ism. Immigration today oft en becomes tied to multiculturalism. Th e West has become 
sensitive to multiculturalism due to the history of the fi rst half of the twentieth century. 
Th e legacies of the Holocaust, colonization, segregated America and apartheid have all 
added to the call for tolerance in an increasingly culturally mixed society. 
Th erefore, several questions arise when dealing with policy-making in diverse so-
cieties. First, is it possible to defi ne socially constructed boundaries or are they relative 
as well? For example, if socially constructed boundaries can be defi ned by a set of cri-
teria resulting in a variety of signifi cant minorities in a democracy, can legislation be 
draft ed to incorporate immigrant groups, and if it can be, then how? If the government 
decides that the native culture should determine which legislation should be adopted 
to enforce what is right in the native culture, cultural domination occurs and the rela-
tivist claim to multiple truths is thrown aside. However, without the option to compro-
mise, draft ing legislation must rely on the governing culture. If the government were to 
draft  loose legislation that could be interpreted by the various groups living within the 
state or city, the government would risk facing the problem of a minority group with 
practices and/or beliefs that were irreconcilable with the governing culture. In this 
situation, it cannot be upheld that “warrantable judgments across cultural boundaries 
can never be made, if only because the failure to act is itself an action that may have 
unacceptable consequences for other people – consequences which are unacceptable 
to us” (Hatch 1997. 374). Th at is evidenced that actual political and societal polemics 
about issues such as arranged or forced marriages, honor killings, acceptability of the 
physical punishment of children, child labor, headscarves, female driving and require-
ments of attending school have all been elements in debates in the West. Since there is 
much literature debating human rights issues as well as controversial actions such as 
honor killings or practices of female genital mutilation, we will not discuss these issues 
here. Rather, we have chosen to briefl y mention a topic that is possibly more far-reach-
ing and less controversial: education and education policy. Considering the concerns 
mentioned above, how can a state develop education curricula and policies in a diverse 
society, especially in minority dominated regions? 
By asking this question, it becomes apparent that diverse societies face this challenge 
even when it comes to less controversial issues like school curricula. We have chosen 
a mild example for the purpose of demonstrating how this challenge can even arise in 
something as basic as sports class requirements. For example, in Austria, all students 
are required to take swimming classes as part of the school sports curriculum and are 
typically co-educational. With an infl ux of immigrants from Muslim countries, espe-
cially from provincial areas of these countries, this aspect of the education curriculum 
is being challenged. Should Muslim girls be forced to partake in these swim classes if 
the co-educational element combined with the required clothing is problematic within 
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these cultures and moral frameworks? Rather than adopting a relativist viewpoint, the 
government opts for a compromise by holding that all students are required to learn 
how to swim and religious exemptions cannot be obtained, but that students can adapt 
their swimming dress to fi t Muslim standards2. Similar issues remain a point of debate 
in several EU countries and they only become more complicated if we are to consider 
discussing an educational subject such as history, especially as more and more cultural or 
moral viewpoints enter the spectrum. Th e more diverse the society is, the greater is the 
challenge in creating legislation. Relativism does not allow for debates and compromises, 
since an individual is locked into his/her own framework. Th erefore, relativism cannot 
off er a solution to challenges faced in policy making in diverse societies.
Relativism can result in unexpected consequences. If one is not able to distinguish the 
truth from what is false, justice from injustice, science cannot proceed to an instrumen-
tal analysis that we, generous liberals, decided to use to measure the service of democ-
racy. Th is leads to potentially disastrous consequences: the hypothesis that because we 
are not able to examine the ends (since all choices are only blind preferences) but solely 
the means leads to accepting existential commitment and facing absolute nothingness.
Why simply accept with relief that which leads us to deny what is true, good and 
just and to receive with respect all cultures that tolerate others? Th e arguments in fa-
vor of tolerance are weakened if the choice of tolerance is only a choice among other 
possibilities, as blind as any other.
Such a view is supported by three axioms that are seldom discussed: 1) the impos-
sibility of knowing goodness or justice, 2) the passionate rejection of all absoluteness, 
and 3) the equality of all cultures which have a respect for diversity, without qualifi ca-
tion. Th ese axioms apparently silence the voice of reason (Strauss 1953. 6-7).
How can anyone seriously assert that exclaiming that something “is simply part of 
a group’s culture” or “within their values” serves to further justice and continuity? In 
the nineteenth century the Maori of the North Island of New Zealand conquered the 
Chatham Islands, inhabited by the Moriori, people of the same origin from a thousand 
years before. Th e Maori had adopted a warring culture, whereas the Moriori had adopted 
a peaceful culture. Th e Maori, according to their custom, captured and killed the entire 
population, hunting down any that attempted to fl ee. Th e Moriori could have retaliated, 
but instead prepared a negotiation based on resource sharing. Th e result was greater 
carnage (Barry 2002. 253-254). Th is example brings into question the idea that a world 
in which all adhere to their own standards would necessarily be peaceful.
Th ere are situations in which ethical relativism is untenable, for it may 
lead to moral neutrality and inaction in situations that are intolerable. 
2 „Schwimmen, als Teil des Lehrplans, sei grundsätzlich verpfl ichtend, allerdings nur in der Volksschule. 
Geschlechtertrennung im Islam spielt jedoch erst ab der Pubertät eine Rolle. Wenn die Eltern dann ihre Töchter 
vom Turnen oder Schwimmen befreien wollen, reicht eine religiöse Begründung nicht aus.“ – Herrner
232  ¨  RENATA KATALIN SMITH – JOSÉ COLEN
Ethical relativism is mistaken when it calls for us to be nonjudgmental in 
relation to such issues as political executions, genocide, genital mutila-
tions, honor killings, and the like (Hatch 1997. 372).
Acceptance of moral relativism becomes more diffi  cult when claiming that acts of 
utter violence are simply ingrained within another culture’s practices and traditions. 
Pluralism
We argue that by turning to a critical pragmatist-pluralist approach we can address the 
concerns raised by the challenges to relativism mentioned above, while continuing to 
recognize that societal and individual diff erences do exist. Although the process is nei-
ther simple nor would we label it as easy, these diff erences can be bridged and the human 
learning process does not bluntly halt at some unspecifi ed point in an individual’s life.
We are “prisoners caught in the framework of our theories…” (Popper 1970. 56), 
but it is possible to break out of this framework if we try hard enough. We then fi nd 
ourselves in a yet bigger framework, out of which we can move with eff ort. Relativism’s 
claim that individuals cannot learn or talk to one another is absurd since 
[relativism] simply exaggerates a diffi  culty into an impossibility. Th e diffi  -
culty of discussion between people brought up in diff erent frameworks is 
to be admitted. But nothing is more fruitful than such a discussion; than 
the culture clash, which has stimulated some of the greatest intellectual 
revolutions (Popper 1970. 56-57).
Fruitful interaction does not have to be limited to a “culture clash” that results in a sci-
entifi c or “intellectual revolution” (Popper 1970. 56-7). In fact this concept can be – and has 
been – taken much further. Fruitful interaction, or dialogue itself, is an integral element of 
human reason. Whereas radical moral relativism leads to a breakdown of reason, 
Dialogue is always dialogue within and at the margins of a tradition, an institu-
tional order, a culture. Immanent critique is immanent to a historical process and its 
transcendental capacity is incremental. A process of trial and error and intelligent 
(Dewey’s favorite word) adaptation is the way we can transcend contemporary prob-
lematics, but this is a perennial process, and transcendence only relative, yet a way of 
life in a learning society (Young 1997. 500).
Critique and self-critique are necessary elements of human reason. However, en-
suring that the critiquing process is meaningful and not superfi cial requires mean-
ingful interaction. Dialogue does not imply disrobing relativism and replacing it with 
universalism. Quite the contrary, rather than disregarding cultural and moral diff er-
ences, a “pragmatic-pluralist” approach “acknowledges the relational – not relativist 
– character of cultures but allows for intercultural critique” (Young 1997. 501).
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Th is further applies to concepts of functioning communities, democracy and al-
lows for draft ing improved legislation. Dialogue becomes more important than fi nd-
ing a unifi ed social framework on which to base laws. Discourse towards a substantive 
common interest matters and unanimity will not be achieved. Instead, political deci-
sions will always be and should always remain contested (Pitkin and Shumer 1982. 
47-48). Although this notion is commonly accepted within democratic pluralism, and 
it is perhaps an obvious answer to draft ing legislation for a diverse society, the dia-
logical concept plays a role of growing importance in confl ict resolution and confl ict 
prevention, and is necessary for continued social learning and mutual understanding 
that both enable functional societies. 
Th e aim of a dialogue is to reach mutual understanding. Th is is what separates dia-
logue from simple conversation. Although many theorists who discuss dialogue would 
not agree on the details of one another’s theories, it is apparent that many can agree on 
using reason as the basis for dialogue to be able to reach greater understanding. Th is aim 
is the basis of all social reason and is supported in diff erent ways by various theorists 
(Berger 2011. 36, Bernstein 1987. 519, & Verkamp 1991. 103-115).3 Peter Berger off ers 
perhaps the most realistic theory of dialogue. He puts forth the needed pre-condition 
and conditions for meaningful dialogue among religious traditions. Although these con-
ditions require that one remain open to the possibility of changing one’s own beliefs in a 
dialogical encounter, this neither means that this is the goal nor the purpose of dialogue. 
Th e goal is to create better understanding, which can help bringing about a more sus-
tainable co-existence. Berger’s concept for interreligious dialogue can be used as a basis 
to create dialogue on diff erences in morals. Th e pre-condition remains true, in that an 
individual must be willing to enter into a dialogical exchange. However, some of Berger’s 
conditions only apply to interreligious dialogue. Th erefore, to create dialogue on morals, 
the conditions will slightly diff er. First, an individual has to accept the possibility of a 
change in personal perspective; in entering a dialogue, we might change our own minds. 
Secondly, it is important that you are able to diff erentiate the core of your own view from 
the diversity of peripheral interpretations. Th ird, much dialogue looks toward reaching 
areas of agreement. However, this agreement does not imply that an individual loses his 
faith or his moral framework. Agreement can occur in areas of commonality while still 
allowing for big diff erences in individuals’ morals4. Fourth, the ‘Other’ should not be 
3 For example, Hans-Georg Gadamer portrays dialogue’s aim as the basis of all social reason and despite 
the lengthy debate between the two, Jürgen Habermas agrees with the essential element of Gadamer’s defi ni-
tion of dialogue diff erentiating between “what he calls “communicative action” that is orientated to mutual 
understanding from the type of “purposive-rational” action that is orientated toward success” (Bernstein 
1987. 519). John Hick’s “Copernican Revolution”, although controversial and disputed, serves as yet another 
example of a scholar promoting a theory based on the pretext of human beings using reason to reach greater 
understanding (Verkamp 1991. 103-115 & Berger 2011. 36).
4 Dialogue serves to create understanding of the ‘Other’ and the ‘Other’s’ point of view to improve coexis-
tence. Th is oft en relies on fi nding common ground, but does not imply an implicit adoption of the ‘Other’s’ 
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seen as an enemy (Berger 2011. 50-82); however, we claim that this condition does not 
necessarily apply to confl ict prevention and resolution. Although the lack of condition 
four slows the process, thereby creating a smaller initial impact, impact is only achieved 
through persistence and continuous engagement over many years.
Some elements may, at fi rst glance, seem unsatisfactory to an idealist, namely, 
that religious fundamentalists and radical relativists will not be found at the dia-
logical table; fundamentalists and relativists “both embody a rejection of reason – 
for the pursuit of reason implies both the possibility of truth and the legitimacy of 
doubt” (Berger 2011. 42). However, the plausibility of dialogue under the conditions 
outlined above is considerably more realistic and applicable to society. Th is pluralist 
dialogical approach maintains an element of doubt while addressing the diffi  culties 
that relativism presents concerning social change and practical policy application as 
well as prevention of violence.
Finally, before turning to our conclusion, we will briefl y touch upon the possibility 
of a universal morality within pluralism. Relativism rejects the possibility of a univer-
sal morality and universalism because they defend that there are morals shared by all 
mankind, usually turning to basic human rights – the right to life, shelter, food, etc. 
Pluralism handles universal morality diff erently. Rather than claiming the unde-
niable existence or absolute impossibility of a universal morality, pluralism presup-
poses the existence of certain universal morals or values to work. Pluralism assumes 
respect for expressing one’s views and respect in listening to another’s. Pluralism in 
this form also assumes a desire to learn, reason and improve, as well as an acceptance 
of questioning one’s own values, a “belief ” in the possibility of doubting. To func-
tion, pluralism requires some form of a universal morality for individuals partici-
pating within a pluralist society. However, this does not mean that the existence or 
establishment of a universal morality is probable or even possible. Th e conditions of 
pluralism require a willingness of an individual to participate in dialogue and an ac-
ceptance of the fact that the individual might change as a result of this dialogue. Th is 
naturally eliminates the participation of dogmatists, radical relativists and anyone 
unwilling to participate in a society based on pluralism. Th ese individuals would not 
be included in any shared values or morals that are prerequisites for pluralism. As it 
would be virtually impossible to convince them or to impose on them the necessary 
elements of pluralism, if pluralism requires voluntary participation then a universal 
morality is logically impossible. 
culture or beliefs – e.g. in the context of religion, that there are similar passages to the Golden Rule in many 
religions, but that does not mean that these religions share all of the same beliefs or that they should do so. 
Despite looking for commonalities, it is equally important to recognize that “it is just as important to say no 
as it is yes” (Berger 2011. 76-78).
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Conclusion
Relativism encompasses many theories and holds a variety of specifi c defi nitions that 
stem from the weak and obvious fact that all things relate to something else. Radical log-
ical or moral relativism imply that there is no truth, no perennial questions, or anything 
good or evil to an individual, because everything depends on the individual’s framework. 
Th is claim is vulnerable to self-refutation, but we presented here additional challenges 
inherent to the logic of relativism. Rather than to summarize, we would like to reiterate 
the questions that these challenges pose: When and why does the social construction of 
an individual end? And how can we understand cultures outside our framework?
However, our main goal has been to present some practical problems that arise 
within a multicultural society by focusing on immigration and education. Globaliza-
tion has changed the reality of many places in the world today by increasing contact 
among diff erent cultures. Holding on to the relativistic claim that an individual’s mor-
als and values are ‘right’ only within his/her own framework can make policy develop-
ment and implementation impossible.
Th e most alarming is that unexpected consequences may follow from relativism, 
especially in its radical form because it can justify violence or atrocities as a moral 
element of a specifi c culture. Holding on to the relativist perspective also prevents 
societal improvement when cultures clash concerning irreconcilable diff erences, and 
it could possibly lead to unrest.
We have briefl y presented pluralism not only as a more sound, but also as a more 
realistic alternative to relativism. Pluralism heeds the notion that human beings have 
frameworks that are sociologically developed. However, these frameworks are neither 
necessarily fi xed nor left  unchallenged as ‘right’ in their own context. A pluralistic 
view solves some paradoxes in relativism since recognizing reason promotes commu-
nication and reconciliation and grants the possibility of discovery processes. Th is does 
not always make policy-making, confl ict prevention or confl ict resolution easy, but 
it creates a platform for compromise. In other words, dialogue is a path leading away 
from several dangers inherent to relativism. However, pluralism does not require a 
universally recognized morality, in fact, as a consequence, sometimes excludes those 
unwilling to participate in dialogue. 
Th e role dialogue plays is to better understand the ‘Other’ and the ‘Oth-
er’s’ point of view, to better be able to co-exist with diff erent cultures. Th is 
does oft en rely on fi nding common ground – e.g. in the context of reli-
gion, that there are similar passages to the Golden Rule in many religions 
– but that does not mean that these religions share all of the same beliefs 
or that they should (Berger 2011. 76-78).
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Th ere is no way to force individuals to engage in a dialogue about their convictions. 
Only people willing to do so and who accept the possibility of compromise can be 
brought to the table, but co-existence should not, in fact, depend on weakening peo-
ple’s faith or moral convictions. Aft er a dialogue encounter, an individual is still able to 
use reason to decide for him/herself. Without this inclusion of reason, truth and jus-
tice become merely a matter of taste: “I like my coff ee with milk and you like it without; 
I am in favor of kindness and you prefer concentration camps” (Berlin 1998/2013. 14).
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